I'm John Batson with my colleague Jack Burnham, who is doing the heavy lifting for all of us,

looking at the Chinese claims and the Chinese production and the Chinese ambitions for competition with the United States.

I used to describe it with one word, very romantic, piracy, but it's more complicated, of course. So, Jack,

I learned from you, you have recommendations for the FCC, and the recommendations are based on

your revelation to me that China is seeking to dominate global telecommunication by ownership,

but not transparent ownership. How does it work, Jack?

Certainly. I would say that it's a bit of a, there's two separate coordinated campaigns going on at

once. I think there's the equipment side of it and then there's the legal side of it from China's

perspective. On the equipment side, it's simply that China as a

manufacturing power has made itself into a key node in a variety of different supply chains for

telecommunications, whether there's be things like submarine cables, the types of internet cables that

go under the ocean that connect the United States, Europe, and other countries that allow most of our global

internet traffic to flow across different markets and different sectors in our economy.

Whether there's be drones, for example, that do connect to American telecommunications networks

for communications are the types of drones that are used by first responders.

Many of those components are made in China,

or whether there's be perhaps ones that you might find in your home, like routers, things like

that that obviously have a key role to play, and our nation's communication systems. China is a key

part in all of those types of supply chains. At the same time, there's the domestic legal architecture

side. So not only the role in the supply chain being

built out via a commitment to manufacturing, but also a commitment to legal formalism. So China

has a variety of different laws, its national security laws, cybersecurity laws, national intelligence

...