I'm John Batcher. Andrea Stricker is here. She's a research fellow and deputy

director of the non-proliferation

program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. This is the education of John Batchel. He had no

idea that chemical weapons were part of the arsenal in Iran, still in Iran. Israel has been striking

it now and again since the length of this war. But what is to be done? You recommend

degrading the supply chain. I think we mentioned China more than once. I tell an anecdote that China

denies categorically across the board that it is aiding in any fashion the Iranian resistance

by shipping weapons there.

Okay.

I saw the other day there was good reporting that China had sent one but several ships loaded

with the makings of rocket fuel.

Suggestive.

I also have reason to believe, according to the Financial Times, that China provided access to a so-called commercial satellite, spy satellite, that gave excellent targeting detail to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, leading to the strike on American basis. The one in Kuwait City led to death. All right, those aren't weapons,

but they are weapons. So what do we know about the PRC and the makings of these aerosols or the

distribution of these marisols, aerosols? Is there a supply chain to interrupt even if they won't

admit to it? Thanks for having me, John. There is a robust supply chain to interrupt even if they won't admit to it?

Thanks for having me, John. There is a robust supply chain that Washington and Jerusalem can target.

A lot of the key supplier countries include China, India, and Mexico.

So applying pressure to these countries is vital to preventing Iran from restoring a chemical weapons supply

chain after the two conflicts. In particular, they can reach out to the Australia group, which covers

chemical weapons supply chains and the UN 1540 committee. And I think both of those platforms can

proactively inform their member states about

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