This is CBSI on the world.

I'm John Batchel.

It is September 1962, Cuba, September 8th, September 16th,

the arrival of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles

capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

The Cuban Missile Crisis.

One more time because a new essay by John Yu, Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute,

distinguished visiting professor at the School of Civic Leadership at the University of Texas, as well as the

Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley Law School.

It points to when and how and what do you use kinetic warfare, that's B2 bombers, to stop worse.

And all the times that it could have stopped worse, and people held back because a ban on war,

a ban on violence, a ban on initiating an attack when you think there's imminent danger.

Professor, a very good evening to you. I'll begin with the Cuban Missile Crisis. You point to it in your essay at Civitas Outlook. The facts support the

fact that John Kennedy and his counselors had to move without crowning evidence with suppositions everywhere and without Congress. They had to move quickly

from the early indication. There were doubts about whether the Soviets would actually put

nuclear weapons into Cuba. They did. They put more nuclear weapons into Cuba than they even

knew at the time. They did not They put more nuclear weapons into Cuba than they even knew at the time.

They did not, we did not know that they deployed nuclear weapons above Guantanamo Bay in case of

invasion. We did not know that there was a Soviet submarine that intercepted our task force,

including an aircraft carrier, lined it up and had a nuclear

torpedo in the tubes. We didn't know any of that, but here we are all these decades later. And

what we learn is that John Kennedy moved effectively in the end, but was gravely concerned that he

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