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🗓️ 21 September 2016
⏱️ 6 minutes
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0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Thursday, September 22nd, 2016 edition of the Sansonet Storms and a Storms and a stormcast. |
0:08.4 | My name is Johannes Ulrich and the day I'm recording from Baltimore, Maryland. |
0:13.2 | Brad got a nice review of recent changes to Locky Crypto ransomware, in particular the switch from executables to DLLs. |
0:23.6 | I guess in part a real surprising issue here is that nothing has changed about the initial |
0:29.6 | downloader, these compressed JavaScript or Windows scripting files, and in part probably |
0:36.6 | because as I pointed out in a diary a couple weeks ago, |
0:41.3 | the antivirus tools really focus on the actual ransomware. So probably by moving from the EXE to the DLL, |
0:50.8 | there is a better chance of actually getting the system encrypted. |
0:56.7 | The initial downloader is all too often not detected, so not a lot of pressure really on the |
1:02.8 | Locky creators here to make any changes to the initial downloader. |
1:07.9 | And just a little reminder to those of you who rely on network-based tools |
1:13.6 | in order to detect the actual malware download, Lockhe does encrypt that part so you don't see |
1:21.6 | the typical MZ header or things like that that usually identified as an executable. Now I'm talking about attacks that |
1:30.5 | are using scripts like JavaScript, VB script, and of course a PowerShell that has been an ongoing |
1:37.5 | problem for Windows and with Windows 10, Microsoft introduced something new and and this is the anti-malware scan interface, |
1:49.0 | which in particular is meant to capture things like malicious PowerShell scripts. |
1:55.0 | There's now a black hat presentation that has been made public that goes to quite a bit of detail in what this tool |
2:02.8 | actually does, what it prevents, and how it can be bypassed by an attacker. Since it's still |
2:09.7 | signature-based, it can be bypassed by obfuscating the binary or the script in this case. For example, you need to change things like variable |
2:20.2 | names and then signatures may no longer be able to identify the script as malicious. But this article |
2:28.8 | goes well beyond that. So if you are using PowerShell scripts in, for example, pen testing work, you may want to take a look at this |
2:37.6 | presentation because, well, with Windows 10 AMSI is enabled by default, so you may run into it. |
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