You're listening to the partially examined life, a podcast by some guys who at one point set on doing philosophy for a living, but then thought better of it.

Our question for episode 392 is something like, to what degree can we know metaphysical truths?

And we read Hegel's early essay, Faith and Knowledge, from 1802, specifically the introduction

in the section on Kantian philosophy.

For more information about the text and the podcast, please see partially examined life.com.

This is Mark Linson-Myer in Madison, Wisconsin, who, once abandoned by the categories, cannot be

anything but a formless lump.

This is Seth Paskin, subjectively certain that the furthest we can possibly get in this text

during this conversation is page 74 in Austin, Texas.

This is Wes Alwyn, more than an empty identity in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

This is Dylan Casey immovably impaled on the stake of the absolute antithesis in Madison, Wisconsin.

This was another insertion. We're supposed to get back to Hagell's phenomenology to talk about

faith. That's where we left off.

But because we read that Habermas essay that was talking about Hegel's critique of the

Enlightenment and specifically what it got wrong about faith, how it had an inadequate notion

of faith, we thought we'd read this one, this essay that he was pointing at, which, I don't

know, Wes and I

read for Close Reads a different early Hegel essay about Hegel versus Kant, and it read pretty smoothly.

It was not a bunch of jargon and gobbledygook, but I guess this is a little later.

This was for this publication that sort of newsletter kind of thing, journal that he was

publishing with Fichta and other folks. And yeah, it's almost as bad as Hagell's phenomenology,

though, in a different way. And then the point of what I wanted to get out of this,

...