All right. Interesting, puzzling, deep in detail problem, which we're going to on a back.

See our back over the next little while, next few minutes.

And that is incentives in a free market, justice system.

Very, very, very, very interesting. So let's first of all look at the ideal and then

look at how incentives might work to sort those out. So the ideal, of course, is prevention. To not

have criminals in the first place, I understand it's completely utopian to say there will be no

criminality. You know, we can get there probably over time as a species, but there will be

certainly in the transition period or, you know, when you've got people coming and going to a

free society from more primitive societies or more state of societies, there could in fact be criminality and so on. Let's just say,

for the sake of argument, that randomly people are just born to be bad. So here's the challenge.

We want to prevent, and that's sort of taken into account with the stuff

I've talked about before, that parents who are raising children would have to submit those children

to brain scans that retract the development of empathy or the presence of trauma patterns in the

brain to have early intervention prevent sociopathy, psychopathy,

cold, callous, evil, whatever, from developing.

So the prevention is key.

But let's just say that there's a certain amount of criminality.

So what you want to do if prevention has failed is you want to provide the minimum punishment with the

maximum chance of curing the criminal. I mean, you don't want to provide no negative feedback

because that doesn't work, but you want to provide the minimum punishment that has the highest chance of fixing

the criminal, of curing the criminal, or at least of curing the person of crime.

So to take an extreme example that would be immoral if you were to lock up, you know,

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