2/4: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO by Tom Nichols (Author), Douglas Stuart, Jeff McCausland (Author),
The John Batchelor Show
John Batchelor
4.5 • 2.8K Ratings
🗓️ 29 September 2023
⏱️ 6 minutes
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Summary
https://www.amazon.com/Tactical-Nuclear-Weapons-NATO-Nichols/dp/1479181951
The role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was “a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart”— a dismissive quip which would have remained true right up until the moment World War III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, “non-strategic nuclear weapons”) still exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, “the longest deadlock” in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the “reset” of their relations, point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a step no sane national leader would take. But it is here that tactical weapons were meant to play their dangerous role, for they would be the arms that provided the indispensable bridge from peace to nuclear war. Thus, the structures of Cold War nuclear doctrines on both sides remain in place, only on a smaller scale.
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Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | I'm John Batch with my colleague Colonel Shepham Kausen, CBS News, U.S. Army Retired, |
| 0:10.5 | artillerymen. We come to the period following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Russian |
| 0:15.8 | Federation reinvention. A man named Yeltsin is president, and yet the numbers of tactical |
| 0:22.4 | and clear weapons on the Russian sides remain very high. We're going to first speak to |
| 0:26.9 | NATO's ambition. NATO has, at this point, I believe 28 members, and those 28 members, |
| 0:35.8 | maybe less, the numbers moved around since the end of the Soviet Union, have to agree |
| 0:40.5 | about policy. And NATO had a policy called deterrence and defense posture review that |
| 0:47.8 | was very important to them. The White House, eventually under Barack Obama, had a policy |
| 0:53.7 | of global zero between DDPR and global zero. There was a lot of talk among our allies. |
| 1:02.6 | And Jeff, we need to attend our allies here because NATO, at this point, was understood |
| 1:07.9 | as a glue of a very successful defense strategy. The Soviets go away. So does the glue still |
| 1:13.9 | work? And one of the salient points I learned from your presentation in this book is that |
| 1:20.4 | NATO sees nuclear weapons policy, especially tactical nuclear weapons, as a way of holding |
| 1:27.0 | NATO together as a form of Atlantis system. Do I say that correctly, Colonel? |
| 1:32.1 | No, I think that's correct, John. Of course, the question was deterring what, and if the |
| 1:37.0 | Russian Soviet Union had gone away, was Russia still a threat, and that raised a lot of |
| 1:41.6 | just quiet in NATO about how many of these particular weapons we needed to have. Europeans |
| 1:47.0 | for a long period of time had mixed feelings. Many places about nuclear weapons on their |
| 1:51.5 | territory. And one important thing that we only touched on slightly was the whole intermediate |
| 1:56.5 | nuclear forces disagreement. When the Russians created an SS-20 missile and as a response, |
| 2:03.3 | the United States deployed the Persing II and the Grand Launch cruise missiles in the 1980s. |
| 2:09.6 | Massive demonstrations in many of our allied countries against that. Those thicker weapons |
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