So one of the issues that we spoke about in late March when we talked last time was what the

pandemic might mean regarding the rise of China. And at the time, there seemed to be a lot of

analysis around that saw the pandemic as straightforwardly aiding China's rise by demonstrating

China's state capacity with that very sharp contrast with the Trump administration in the

US and also enhancing China's soft power.

But talking now in mid-August, the picture looks quite different. There seems to be a rise in

anti-China feeling across the political spectrum in the United States and in Europe.

Do you think this has been a case of China playing its diplomatic hand poorly, or do you think

there are quite deep roots to Antichina feeling in the West

that made that story about the pandemic smoothing the path to Chinese preeminence always a bit

unlikely? I think you're right. I think it was naive to expect either the Europeans or the

Americans would take kindly to, you know, magnificent displays of Chinese generosity.

And on the other hand, it was also naive, I think, to expect that Beijing would play its hand well,

because it doesn't really have that much experience of that kind of diplomacy dealing with Europe and the United States,

because it is, after all, historically unprecedented.

And I think it has worked out just about how one might expect with that backdrop in mind.

I've been surprised, especially in Europe, I have to say, less in the US,

because there the rise of anti-China sentiment goes back several years,

and it's a bipartisan thing, as is now, I think,

perfectly evident in the US. I have must say, I've been very surprised by the intensity of

the backlash in Europe, which opinion poll evidence like the German Marshall Fund's latest

survey suggests is stronger in Europe than it is in the US and across the board. So it's not just over

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