Very nice to welcome so many of you to this Sanchetimes seminar.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Professor Giesneroul from the University of Yenna in Germany.

She is a good friend to a number of people here, so it's a great delight to welcome

her. She tells me the picture she's going to present today is a response to a paper presented

by Professor Stefan Pogunauer at Oxford. And given that she's presented it here first, it must be right.

If they go to Oxford to tell them why, they've got everything all wrong.

Just before she starts, could I also just draw your attention to the fact that

Eleanor Sharpton, the British Advocate General at the Court of Justice,

is coming to talk primarily to the undergraduates in the undergraduate lecture next Monday at 12 o'clock in the large lecture theatre.

But if any of you have not had the opportunity of hearing Professor Elder Sharpton talk before, she is a great speaker and if you have time I would recommend that you just come along and sit in the picture theatre.

So can I now hand the floor over to the room? He's going to currently talk for about sort of 40 minutes and then 10 minutes or so for questions.

I think I talk a little bit of the last so there's more.

Fantastic. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you first, Catherine, for the friendly introduction and also thank you for the invitation to come to Cambridge.

I was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge a couple of years ago.

I had a wonderful time, so I'm always happy to have a reason to come back to this wonderful place.

The paper that I'm going to present today deals with regulatory competition in contract law and it was inspired by a conference that took place last year in Munich at the Center for Advanced Studies.

That conference dealt with regulatory competition in contract law,

and I had to present a paper on the choice of law framework

for efficient regulatory competition and contract law.

That means my paper basically dealt with the legal framework

and the question of how choice of law can make sure that

regulatory competition and contract law is efficient or works efficiently.

...