Hi, Dr. Craig. I've been looking through your views on soteriology and hermatiology, and I'd like some clarification on something.

If we maintain libertarian free will and reject the classic doctrine of original sin, inheritance

of guilt and a corrupted nature, instead believing that the inclination to sin is due to

a combination of our animalistic self-preserving instincts and exposure to a morally corrupt

social environment, sinlessness still appears to be

metaphysically possible for any individual, given that they are still free to choose to do good

or evil at any point. Does this mean that due to the sheer frequency and power of temptation,

the universality of sin is a matter of statistical inevitability rather than theological necessity,

or in other words, that sinlessness for any individual is metaphysically possible, but has a

probability of 0%. Also, in your Molinist framework, would you say that a world where some humans

remain sinless is metaphysically possible but not feasible for God to

actualize, with the assumption that these humans have libertarian free will exist after the fall

and do not possess superadded grace, or that it is feasible and that God prefers a world in which

no person remains sinless, perhaps for reasons pertaining to the optimal balance of saved individuals?

As an aside, your teaching materials have been incredibly helpful and formative in my own

theological views, and you've made me a recent convert to Molynism after being long undecided

on the nature of God's sovereignty and predestination. I had previously disagreed with the notion

of imputed guilt in

original sin, but I hadn't considered rejecting the corrupted nature part, so I needed to think

through the implications. Blessings, Rowan, United Kingdom. I don't suppose that you are the

former Archbishop of Canterbury, are you, Rowan? Your theological acumen is evident in the

question you ask. You have ably summarized my view and drawn out its implication that while it is

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