Please respond to Michael Humor's criticism of your divine command theory.

Link attached.

Graham.

United States. I've, link attached, Graham, United States.

I've already done so, Graham. In my debate with Eric Wielandberg on God and morality, I defended a divine command theory of ethics. In the published version of our debate, Wielenberg tapped Wesley Morrison

and Michael Humor as commentators on the debate, to whom I in turn responded. Although much more

is said in the book than I can summarize here, I'll extract my responses to humor's objection

to my divine command theory. In the debate, I argued that divine command theory provides a good

explanation of the objectivity of moral values and duties. I defended two sub-points.

First, theism provides a sound foundation for the objectivity of moral values. I explained that on the

theistic view, objective moral values are grounded in God.

As St. Anselm saw, God is, by definition, a maximally great being and therefore perfectly good.

Indeed, he is not merely perfectly good,

as a maximally great being,

he is the paradigm of moral value.

God's own holy and loving character

supplies the absolute standard

against which all things are measured. Thus, if God exists,

moral values are objective, being wholly independent of human beings. Second, theism provides a sound

foundation for the objectivity of moral duties.

I defended the view that objective moral duties are constituted by God's will or commands.

Far from being arbitrary, God's commandments must be consistent with His holy and loving nature.

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