Once you accept the logic of the two-state solution, then you allow for negotiation games to take place.

And what happened was you ended up having, you know, the Madrid process start.

And of course, Arab countries enter it.

Initially, it starts on much better terms than the Oslo terms.

But still, and I remind our listeners and viewers here,

you know, on the basis of this very unjust solution for the Palestinian people.

If the basis is 242 and giving away 78% of Palestine, you're basically negotiating over the remaining 22%.

How does Oslo and Al-Fest's decision to sign the Oslo Accords? How does that, how does that

transition us from this earlier era to where we are today? And then how do we get to the question of,

you know, what are the Palestinian sort of national options today, given Oslo and given everything

that's happened, and then, of course,

the rise of Hamas and so on and so forth. These are big questions, but just somehow to segue from

the 50s to where we are today via Oslo. Yeah, I mean, the one thing I would say before that segue

is that it's important to note the structure that develops after the PLO is created

and the relationship with the Arab states, because that explains Oslo.

That is a big part of it.

So if you look at the pattern, it happens, as soon as the PLO is founded, every Arab state wants to have some form of role in it and in directing it.

So that's a big issue.

Okay.

And then later on, you know, after 67, the effort intensifies on the part of different Arab states

to represent their official ideologies and positions, but also their actual people within the Palestinian national arena.

Now, certain states had a privileged position in relation to that, and the most important was Syria.

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