For centuries, Russia was a great power with expansionist ambitions to its west.

War was indeed a constant for the Russian state, with foes ranging from Poland, the Ottoman

Empire and Finland, to Britain, France and Russia.

Later, in the 20th century, the USSR exercised control over much of central in Eastern Europe

and of the guise of a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

For some, this was a continuation of age-old great power politics.

For others, the response of a new and profoundly modern, ideological project.

For a short while after the Cold War, such geopolitical tribulations seemed a thing of

the past.

Not only was history over, and ideological contestation of fading memory, but the Russia of the

Tsars, which viewed itself as a world power preceding the revolution of 1917, was also

seemingly gone.

Yet, in recent years, that has started to change.

At the turn of the millennium, the Russian Federation saw its economy stabilise under Vladimir

Putin, and later engaged in military conflicts abroad, Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and

now a full invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

But what are some of the ideas underpinning this new Russian assertiveness and expansionism,

and what is the influence in particular of traditionalism, until recently a minestrain

of ultra-conservative thought among the country's political players and networks?

Finally, how does this relate to broader ideas and circulation among the global populist

rights?

Are there really ideological similarities, for instance, between Steve Bannon and Alexander

...