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Philosophy Bites

Monima Chadha on Responsibility Without Selves

Philosophy Bites

Nigel Warburton

Education, Philosophy, Society & Culture

4.52K Ratings

🗓️ 18 May 2026

⏱️ 18 minutes

🧾️ Download transcript

Summary

Buddhist philosophy rejects the idea of the self. How then can there be any moral responsibility? Monima Chadha, Professor of Indian Philosophy at Oxford University, explains. 

This episode was supported by the Ideas Workshop, part of the Open Society Foundations

Transcript

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0:00.0

This is Philosophy Bytes with me David Edmonds and me Nigel Warburton.

0:06.0

Philosophy Bites is available at www.

0:09.0

www.philosophybites.com.

0:11.0

Monomer Chadr, Professor of Indian Philosophy at Oxford University, has been influenced by both Buddhist philosophers, such as the 4th to 5th century Indian thinker Varsabandu, and by the Oxford

0:22.7

philosopher Derek Parfit. Buddhists and Parfit both face a puzzle. They deny the existence

0:28.8

of an enduring self. But without a self, how can there be moral responsibility?

0:34.9

Monomachada, welcome to Philosophy Bites. Thank you for inviting me, Nigel. It's a pleasure to be here.

0:41.2

The topic we're going to talk about today is responsibility without selves. There is a almost clichéed view about

0:47.6

Buddhism that at its heart, it has this view that we do not have ourselves. Could you just explain how that could possibly be so?

0:55.3

Because most of us go around most of the time feeling very much that we have selves or a self.

1:02.3

One popular understanding of the Buddhist view is that we don't have something like a metaphysical soul substance,

1:10.2

you know, very much like Descartes thought and even the

1:12.7

Hindus in the Indian tradition thought of the Atman as the soul substance which accounts

1:18.7

for identity over time. That's the thing that makes us the same thing over time. So what the

1:24.5

Buddhists want to say, they want to deny that there is an enduring self, in virtue of

1:29.4

which you are the same person over a lifetime and even perhaps beyond lifetimes. But I think their

1:36.6

critique of the self goes deeper. The argument that I have in mind was given by a fourth, fifth

1:42.8

century, Abidharma philosopher Vasubandu,

1:46.0

who questions not just the metaphysical soul substance, but also our intuitive conception of the

1:53.2

self, where we think of the self as the agent who acts, as the subject of experiences, and the person who bears responsibility. Vasubandhu

2:03.9

wants to give an account of all of those phenomena without a self. If I've understood this

2:08.9

correctly, at a metaphysical level, there's just flux. The self is a kind of illusion that is

...

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