Here we lose a potential, we could have signed something and I couldn't 100% signed something

that we actually had papers ready to be signed but it just wasn't appropriate. I want to do it right. I'd much rather do it right than do it fast.

Just like in prison. Um, you so sometimes you got to walk away. That's what the president said about the North Korean summit.

Sure. Absolutely. To discuss the summit, another matters political. We are pleased to welcome back to the Armstrong and Gettyshow Lawn-Hee Chen.

Host of the podcast, Crossing Lines with Lawn-Hee Chen also, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, director of domestic policy studies, lecture and public policy at Stanford University, a quaint little community college in Northern California. Lawn-Hee, how are you, sir?

Good morning, gentlemen. How are you? It's merely my inferiority complex that makes me make those little jokes at Stanford's expense. I hope you will forgive me and or pity me.

Or pity me. Yeah. Okay. I'm sure you already pity me. Anyway, so hey, my theory, I Joe, have been saying for quite some time.

The most likely outcome by far is that North Korea gets a usable nuclear arsenal and we just have to live with it.

And any hope to the contrary has been a long shot. Would you agree or how do you see the question?

Well, I think that a fair amount of pessimism is warranted in this entire process. And from all along leading up to the Hanoi summit, leading up to the most recent set of discussions, I was warning people that to expect a deal I think is overly optimistic because of the conditions on the ground that we know of in North Korea.

And I say we know of because the reality is we really don't know how far along they are in many respects. They've got elements of nuclear capability that we're not aware of, which by the way was one of the reasons why in this negotiation, the United States was demanding a full accounting from the North Koreans of what they had.

And even that they were unwilling to do so I do think to a certain degree, the North Koreans are far enough along in their nuclear program. They have enough to sell material developed. They have warheads. They're able to put that material on warheads.

That this is a serious set of considerations. And so I'm glad that we're engaging in discussions with them, but I'm not surprised we weren't able to reach a breakthrough in this summit.

Would North Korea, if they just are accepted as a nuclear state by the world, would they be the craziest nuclear state or would Pakistan still have that tidal even?

Well, this week, I mean, you know, there's been a lot of conflict between Pakistan and India in the Kashmir region, which is the disputed region between the two countries, the Pakistanis.

The problem with Pakistan is that it's never entirely clear who's in charge. You've got the sort of triumvirate of authorities there. You've got the intelligence services, which are incredibly powerful.

You've got the military and of course you've got the civilian leadership. And the problem with Pakistan is less that there is unpredictable or eccentric as Kim Jong-un.

It's more that you just never know who's in charge when so reminds me of a lot of places. Yeah, well, and it's not unusual to see in that part of the world.

So I feel like the North Korea, we shouldn't simply accept that North Korea is a nuclear power. We should want to do something about the Korean peninsula to seek denuclearization.

But the reality is they're quite far along and we have to accept that they are where they are and do our best to try and push them away from nuclear folly.

One of the things we like best about talking to you, Lon, he is that you're thoroughly acquainted with the conventional wisdom, but you're not a slave to it.

Having said that, what do you think of the unconventional Trump approach to summits and getting together with world leaders and Kim Jong-un in particular?

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