This is CBSI in the world.

I'm John Batchel.

I welcome my good colleague Peter Berkowitz at the Hoover Institution, writing his column at Real Clear Politics.

Lessons learned from the October 7th, 2023 war by the Israeli political echelon, the politicians, and the senior military staff.

Peter, a very good evening to you. You have four lessons, and they're hard to go over because I

agree with all of them. We have a situation in Gaza right now that is extremely unclear.

The wreckage around all of the refugees testifies to years ahead of rebuilding. The question often raised, though, is, will Hamas make a

comeback? Is it still the government of Gaza? Why rebuild if it is? What is to be done? And your political

lessons and military lessons learned are pertain to how we got to where we are right now. First is

something I did not know. The leadership in Israel assumed that the military would solve this in the

winter of 2024. They were wrong. Why were they wrong? Is that part of the assessment, Peter?

Good evening to you. Good evening, John. Yes, it is part of the assessment. The first error,

and I should say these are errors that are identified by a man named E. Altshir Cohen,

who was writing in Hebrew a few weeks ago, and he was a member of the hostage negotiating team,

a military man himself.

And he said the first error that Israel made, and he was part of the team making the errors,

wasn't supposing, as you said, that in January, February, March, April, of 24,

Israel would be able to inflict the decisive blow against the military leadership of Hamas.

Now, they did achieve some spectacular results. They killed Marwan Issa, who was the deputy commander of Hamas. Now, they did achieve some spectacular results.

They killed Marwan Issa, who was the deputy commander of Hamas' military wing.

In July, they killed Mohamed Dief, who was the military chief.

And then in October, Yaya Sinwar, who was the top leader of Hamas and Gaza.

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