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SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)

ISC StormCast for Tuesday, October 6th 2020

SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)

SANS ISC Handlers

News, Tech News

4.9754 Ratings

🗓️ 6 October 2020

⏱️ 6 minutes

🧾️ Download transcript

Summary

Daily 5 min cyber security news summary. News, patches, vulnerabilities and trends in information and network security. Repetition Obfuscation; UEFI Malware; AV Priv Escalation Flaw; Rapid7 SMTP Scan

Transcript

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0:00.0

Hello, welcome to the Tuesday, October 6, 2020 edition of the Sansonet Storm Center's Stormcast.

0:07.6

My name is Johannes Ulrich.

0:09.4

And today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida.

0:13.5

TheE today is writing about how to deal with a fairly, well, annoying, maybe not sophisticated,

0:20.3

obfuscation technique, and that's hiding a string inside a larger

0:26.2

repeating string. So the first string is just repeated over and over and then in between these

0:33.7

repeated strings you have sort of one letter at a time, the actual obfuscated payload.

0:39.3

In this particular case, of course, some PowerShell script.

0:43.3

Once you recognize what's happening, well, it's not all that difficult to deal with this obfuscation technique.

0:51.3

And of course, Dillet, as usual, has a Python script to take care of this

0:57.4

for you, Dauphuscate repetitions.py.y. And this script, well, as so many scripts, do does take

1:06.0

the annoying part away from you. It does find the repeating string and removes it in order for you then to just

1:15.4

read back the decoded payload. And Kasperski wrote up an interesting piece of malware that

1:24.2

they came across. That's actually a modified UEFI firmer image.

1:30.2

UEFI, the model replacement for what used to be done by bias is, of course, one of those

1:37.1

places where if you can hide your malware in UEFI, it's very difficult to remove it and even to discover it.

1:47.0

Now, in this particular case, the modified UFI image did write a malicious file to the Windows

1:55.0

startup folder whenever the system was rebooted.

2:00.0

So Antimalver may, for example, later find that malicious file, remove it well on the next

2:06.1

reboot because the UAFI, of course, did not get cleaned up.

2:11.9

You will end up with that same malicious file again in your startup folder.

2:17.8

Kasperski believes that this particular sample was based on similar Malbara, a UFI

...

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