ISC StormCast for Tuesday, November 26th 2019
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 26 November 2019
⏱️ 5 minutes
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Summary
Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Tuesday, November 26, 2019 edition of the Sandtonet Storm Center's |
| 0:06.3 | Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ulrich, and I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:12.9 | I've got a quick diary today from Xavier about Dines over HDPS again, but this time a little bit |
| 0:19.1 | a different spin on it as to how to sort of get |
| 0:22.4 | a good balance between privacy and network monitoring. What you're usually concerned about |
| 0:29.4 | with DNS over HDPS is, for example, your ISP altering DNS data or using it, for example, for commercial purposes. |
| 0:41.3 | Now, what Xavier is proposing is that you pretty much keep traditional DNS working inside your network, |
| 0:49.5 | but then your internal resolver is using DNS over HDPPS to connect to a trusted DNS over HGPS |
| 0:59.0 | endpoint. In Xavier's case, he picked Cloudflare. And he also uses good old pie hole in order |
| 1:06.0 | to do some filtering with reverse policy zones on what users are able to resolve. So the internal |
| 1:14.6 | resolver still gets all the network monitoring data that you need, but your ISP is no longer able to |
| 1:21.3 | interfere with your DNS traffic. And talking about privacy, security company Sec consult did publish details regarding a |
| 1:31.3 | vulnerability that FortyNet fixed last week. |
| 1:36.3 | FortyNet, like many similar products, is sending, for example, URLs that a user is browsing |
| 1:43.3 | to and host names and the like back |
| 1:46.0 | to its own systems in order to check if they are on any blacklists. |
| 1:52.0 | Now, this information is of course sensitive and should be encrypted. |
| 1:57.0 | They could have done something like TLS, but instead they went apparently for their own encryption scheme, which meant that they would just XOR the data using a static key. |
| 2:09.9 | Now XOR is not necessarily bad if you are using a very random key, often used with one-time pads and not a bad system in this case, |
| 2:20.3 | but using the same key over and over, of course, that doesn't work. |
| 2:24.3 | Once the attacker, for example, can guess a certain URL that you're visiting, they can easily then derive the key. |
| 2:32.3 | And in this case, it appears that the key was actually derived from |
... |
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