ISC StormCast for Tuesday, April 21st 2020
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 21 April 2020
⏱️ 6 minutes
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Summary
Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Tuesday, April 21st, 2020 edition of the Sandinand Storm Center's Stormcast. |
| 0:08.5 | My name is Johannes Ulrich. |
| 0:10.2 | The time I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:14.0 | Did he today went back to an earlier diary where he looked at the K-Pot Info Steeler, |
| 0:19.6 | and back then he ended up with an obfuscated auto IT script. |
| 0:26.0 | Now, today he analyzed this auto IT script in a lot more detail, and a real nice example, |
| 0:33.5 | sort of how to go through the different obfuscation steps being used here to actually arrive at the final result. |
| 0:40.8 | It's supposed to be executed here. |
| 0:42.9 | It all started with what looks like a certificate. |
| 0:47.0 | But, well, certificates are really just base 64 encoded data. |
| 0:51.9 | And when you decode this particular certificate, you end up with the actual |
| 0:57.6 | script that's being executed. But this is not where it stops. This script is heavily off |
| 1:04.4 | uscated. And what DDA eventually ended up with was actually some shell code. |
| 1:11.6 | And this shell code is then being executed using process hollowing. |
| 1:18.6 | Process hollowing is a pretty neat trick to bypass a lot of defensive techniques. |
| 1:24.6 | What it basically does is it creates a process in a suspended state, |
| 1:29.1 | and then when the memory is unmapped, it just replaces that memory with malicious code. |
| 1:34.5 | So this way, essentially, you can sort of swap the memory off a process that's considered |
| 1:40.7 | benign that's already running. Now, similar technique actually process injection, |
| 1:47.8 | which sort of also basically uses a legitimate process, a process that has already been vetted |
| 1:54.0 | in order to execute malicious code. DDA is also pointing out some differences between the static analysis he's doing here |
| 2:02.5 | and dynamic analysis in that the mutex being created here by the process usually should |
... |
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