ISC StormCast for Thursday, July 14th, 2022
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 14 July 2022
⏱️ 6 minutes
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Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Thursday, July 14th, 2020 edition of the Sansonet Storm Center's Stormcast. |
| 0:08.6 | My name is Johannes Ulrich, and today I'm recording from Sands Fire here in Washington, D.C. |
| 0:16.6 | Xavier came across a fishing email that implemented a slightly different version of what we have seen before of sort of self-customizing phishing page. |
| 0:25.7 | The link the user clicks on does include the victim's email address. |
| 0:30.0 | So what the phishing page does is it extracts the domain part of that email address and then loads the victim's homepage inside an eyeframe. |
| 0:41.5 | In the past, we sometimes have seen this sort of done via curl, |
| 0:44.3 | but this particular phishing page is as so often hosted within Google's Firebase storage, |
| 0:51.4 | and there, of course, only sort of static HTML with the JavaScript is |
| 0:55.8 | allowed, which does limit the attacker to use iFrams in order to load the remote page. |
| 1:03.3 | But since the original YRLD victim visited did include the victim's email address, that email |
| 1:09.4 | address is now passed as a refer, and the organization should be able to identify |
| 1:15.0 | any possible victims of this phishing scam by looking at referral logs. |
| 1:20.9 | And of course, you also may want to take a look at limiting how your page is being displayed |
| 1:25.7 | in an eye frame. |
| 1:26.8 | The old option here was x-frame |
| 1:28.6 | option headers the newer way of blocking that is via content security policies and the frame |
| 1:35.6 | ancestor attribute and sticking with fishing here for another story crowd strike is reporting how |
| 1:43.4 | they have been seeing some fishing emails |
| 1:46.5 | that are impersonating security companies like GroutStrike. Now in this case, the attacker |
| 1:52.1 | actually doesn't ask the user to click on a link. The email claims that the security company |
| 1:57.5 | detected some vulnerability in the victim's network and then asked the victim |
| 2:04.0 | to call them back. Of course, this then comes down to one of those tech support scams, but |
... |
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