ISC StormCast for Monday, February 11th 2019
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 11 February 2019
⏱️ 7 minutes
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Summary
Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Monday, February 11, 2019 edition of the Sandsenet Storm Center's Stormcast. |
| 0:08.0 | My name is Johannes Ulrich, and I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:13.5 | The way most fishing sites work is that an attacker sets up a website, has full access of course to the server, uploads files |
| 0:23.3 | that will emulate the form and will collect the data, pretty much sort of like any website |
| 0:29.9 | does it, and then store the data on the server and exfiltrate it to the attacker, or even |
| 0:36.8 | just stored on the server and the attacker will |
| 0:39.3 | periodically download. |
| 0:41.6 | Xavier, however, came across a fishing website that's taking a little bit of more modern |
| 0:45.8 | approach to collecting the data. |
| 0:48.6 | Instead of having actually a scripting language like php.net or whatever, the entire fishing attack is actually implemented |
| 0:56.9 | in JavaScript and the JavaScript will collect the data from the victim and then report it to a site |
| 1:05.6 | that's actually doing all the central collection. Of course, the advantage of this scheme is that if anybody |
| 1:12.4 | takes down the fishing site, they will be left with very little sort of forensic evidence. |
| 1:17.9 | They will not recover typically any of the usernames and passwords that users have entered |
| 1:24.3 | in the fishing site while it was active. They may see based on the web logs, how many people sort of visit this site, but that's |
| 1:33.7 | about all they would be able to get from this site. |
| 1:37.7 | Of course, this approach is also much easier to set up. |
| 1:41.6 | Could easily be done on a compromised website. The attacker doesn't really need |
| 1:46.4 | sort of full access to this site, just needs to be able to get their JavaScript and the |
| 1:51.9 | HTML form somehow placed on the site. In this particular case, actually, Saville also found |
| 1:59.0 | the script that then receives the data that's being collected via |
| 2:02.9 | JavaScript and in this case it's also just directly emailed to the attacker. And Akamai is |
... |
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