ISC StormCast for Friday, September 30th, 2022
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 30 September 2022
⏱️ 6 minutes
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| 0:00.0 | Hello and welcome to the Friday, September 30th, 2020 edition of the Sands and at Storm Center's Stormcast. |
| 0:08.6 | My name is Johannes Ulrich, and today I'm recording from the Not Terribly Windy and Not Terribly Rainy Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:18.9 | The Deast Diary today introduced the latest update to his PNG dump tool. |
| 0:24.3 | Well, the name sort of gives it away. |
| 0:26.1 | It's a tool to analyze PNG image files. |
| 0:30.2 | The tool identifies anomalies that are often used in PNG files, in particular if they |
| 0:36.7 | contain embedded malware, for example, if parts |
| 0:40.2 | of the file are not properly compressed, which typically is the case for PNG. |
| 0:47.6 | Iced ID is a malware family that takes advantage of this technique, and for Iced ID, the payload is usually RC4 encrypted, but the key |
| 0:57.9 | is prepended to the payload. So the DAS tool will now decrypt the payload for you. In case you |
| 1:05.4 | wonder, why do they make it so easy? Why is it just a key and then the encrypted payload? Well, the goal here is not |
| 1:12.0 | really sort of encryption per se to hide or the confidentiality of the malware. It's really |
| 1:17.7 | more obfuscation. They could probably have just extort the payload with that key and it would |
| 1:23.7 | have worked as well. Today, a blog post by a Vietnamese security company, |
| 1:30.3 | GTSC caused some concern as it reports about a new and so far unpatch, |
| 1:35.5 | but already exploited vulnerability in Microsoft's Exchange server. |
| 1:40.7 | GTSC found out about this vulnerability when they analyzed a compromised server, and |
| 1:45.7 | they described the vulnerability as being similar to the infamous proxy log-on issue. |
| 1:52.2 | Now, it does require authentication, so there's a little bit of a hurdle to overcome for the attacker, |
| 1:58.6 | but once the attacker's authenticated, well, the sky is the limit, |
| 2:01.9 | so to speak, and GTSC found a web shell installed on the compromised server, which is something |
| 2:08.7 | that was also done with the original proxy log-on vulnerability. So far, there is no official |
... |
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