ISC StormCast for Friday, January 6th 2017
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 6 January 2017
⏱️ 6 minutes
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Summary
Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Friday, January 6th, 2017 edition of the Sandcent, Stormcent, Stormcast. My name is |
| 0:08.0 | Johannes Ulrich, and today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. Earlier this week, the registra |
| 0:15.1 | that is hosting Google's Brazilian domain, Google.com.com.B.R. apparently was compromised, and Google's Brazilian domain, Google.com.B.R apparently was compromised and Google's name |
| 0:24.4 | servers were pointed to a different destination. With that, the attacker, of course, had full |
| 0:31.3 | control over all Google.com.com.B.R. DNS entries, MX records, and the like, and could change them at will. |
| 0:40.7 | Now, they also changed the TTL, the time to live, to 24 hours. So if during the half hour window, |
| 0:47.2 | when the malicious DNS servers were active, you requested an IP address from that domain, You would then cash it for a full day before |
| 0:58.3 | it would expire and you would only then look up the correct IP address after Google fixed the |
| 1:05.8 | problem. This does keep happening to some of Google's foreign properties we had, I think, two years ago. |
| 1:12.9 | The Malaysian domain was, if I remember correctly, at least compromised twice. |
| 1:18.4 | All of this is not really within the control of Google, because for some of these country-level |
| 1:24.3 | domains, actually other companies are running the name servers, |
| 1:29.4 | and with that, of course, they don't really have any effect on how those name servers of the |
| 1:35.8 | registrars that are hosting these country level domains are managed. |
| 1:41.6 | Now, Renato Marino did create a real crate right up about this particular issue |
| 1:46.9 | with lots of details like the IP address and such that were involved in this particular attack. |
| 1:53.1 | He himself resides in Brazil so he had sort of a first person view of this particular event. |
| 2:00.2 | As far as everybody else's domain goes, you really |
| 2:03.8 | have to monitor your domains, make sure they're not being altered. This was sort of the most |
| 2:10.2 | obvious change in Hacker could make. We have seen, of course, in the past, when NetHacker would, |
| 2:15.4 | for example, just change MX records or add |
| 2:19.2 | additional host names in order to use them in targeted fishing attacks. |
... |
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