ISC StormCast for Friday, August 18th 2017
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 18 August 2017
⏱️ 16 minutes
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Summary
Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Friday, August 18th, 2017 edition of the Sands and its Storm Center's Stormcast. |
| 0:07.4 | My name is Johannes Ulrich, and the day I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:11.9 | It looks like the bad guys just don't run out of features to take advantage of in Microsoft's Office software. |
| 0:19.6 | The latest feature is auto-updating links. You can link different |
| 0:24.0 | documents with each other in office, for example, a Word document in this case that includes an |
| 0:29.8 | RTF document and Office or Word in this case will automatically pull in that file in order |
| 0:36.8 | to update the related content. Well, in this particular case, will automatically pull in that file in order to update the related content. |
| 0:39.3 | Well, in this particular case, the attacker is using this trick in order to download a malicious |
| 0:45.2 | RTF document that then has additional exploit code in it. |
| 0:50.9 | This way, of course, they're avoiding some of the detection mechanisms that look for specific |
| 0:56.4 | download techniques in your web proxies. You may see these requests with a user agent of Microsoft |
| 1:03.8 | Office Protocol Discovery. Now, this of course by itself doesn't mean it's malicious. This |
| 1:10.7 | particular user agent is used for a bunch of different things. |
| 1:15.0 | But take a look and see if you find anything interesting. |
| 1:19.7 | And according to a paper published at Eusnix by researchers from IBM, it looks like the |
| 1:25.9 | Rohhammer attack is back and this time for MLC |
| 1:31.1 | Nant flash memory that's commonly found in SSD disks. |
| 1:36.4 | Now if you remember, the original Rohhammer attack affected RAMs memory and what essentially |
| 1:43.0 | did was that an attacker has access to a limited part of memory. |
| 1:47.9 | The attacker can now flip bits very quickly within the memory the attacker has access to. |
| 1:54.1 | And by doing so due to interference with adjacent rows, the attacker can actually in a somewhat controlled way flip bits in other parts of memory that the attacker typically would not have access to. |
| 2:09.1 | So apparently the same trick pretty much works with these MLC NAND flash chips and does affect solid state drives. An attacker essentially could |
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