It started with Kermit memes. A lot of Kermit Sipping Tea memes, you know kind of Kermit commenting on Miss Piggy. It's actually like kind of raunchy like the post. It was very irreverent. Then one day there's a post of Homer Simpson and it says something like I killed

Kermit or Kermit's taking a break or Kermit's gone now this is my page.

That's Renee DeResta, one of our nation's leading experts on information warfare.

In 2017 the Senate Intelligence Committee

asked Renee to investigate Russian attempts to manipulate voters

through social media by handing her data sets from suspicious social media

accounts. She started piecing together what Russian Asians

posted to these accounts from day one. And what's the first thing she sees? Images

of Kermit the frog and Homer Simpson. She's mystified. Is my data set broken or my number is pointing to the wrong things, what the hell's going on here?

What's going on here is one of the least understood aspects of how disinformation campaigns work.

Russia's campaign, for instance, didn't necessarily begin with a masterful manipulation of

voter sentiments.

Many accounts made no effort reference to politics at all.

Instead, they posted content that was eminently likable. They cycle

through beloved cultural icons like Kermit the frog, Homer Simpson, or Yosemite Sam

because their goal was deceptively simple.

Rack up followers. their goal was deceptively simple.

Rack up followers.

And so you see them doing the hashtag follow back

and all of you know there's like 20 hashtags, 30 hashtags

per post at the beginning.

Follow us back basically.

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