Hello, and thank you for listening to The History of World War II podcast, Episode

78, The Battle of Betafalm.

On January 24, 1941, as the Fourth Armored Brigade tour into General Bannini's armored group

near Makili, Wavel was an O'Connor's headquarters to discuss taking Benghazi. Their enthusiasm matched

those of Whitehall, but as the commanders on the ground, their job was to figure out if it

was doable.

After all, if it was possible, the whole of Sireneica would be in allied hands, and Egypt in

the Suez would be that much more safe.

Bannini could then be set up as an advanced base that could either support further incursions

west or serve as the most Western defensive position against the Italians.

And finally, with Sireneica in British hands, troops and equipment could finally be pulled

back into reserve into Egypt, just as Churchill wanted and kept pushing for.

But there were other considerations.

Rather, Wavel nor O'Connor wanted to be guilty of what the Italians had blundered into,

namely, moving ahead before always in place to guarantee the best chance of success.

Up until this point, Wavel's logistical staff, including General Jembo Wilson, along

with O'Connor's staff, had made logistic miracles a matter of routine in order to get

13th Corps as far as McKeeley.

But all good things must come to an end.

That supply line, as well as the remainder of O'Connor's armor, was in shambles.

The leader of the desert rats, General Michael of Moore Krieg, was down to 50 cruiser tanks,

which were meant for tank versus tank combat, and 95 light tanks, which only housed a machine

...