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Hey, this is the Partial Exam in Life episode 308 part 2.

We've just been discussing G. Moore's proof of the external world.

We're going to spend a little more time on that and move to certainty.

So, you know, Moore's gone through his delineation of all these different ways of interpreting this

and presented his two-hand proof. He then goes on to say that he can make the same claim about

things in the past so you can prove that things have existed in the past and not stuck in some kind of

idealistic solipsism but only present idealistic solipsism. Then he says,

this is on page 168, you know, he's given these two conclusive proofs of the existence of

external objects. He says, I'm perfectly well aware that in spite of what I've said,

many philosophers will still feel I have not given any satisfactory proof.

And he says, I want to say why this dissatisfaction should be felt.

And he says, one reason is some people understand proof of an external world is including a proof of

things which I haven't attempted to prove and haven't proved. It's not quite easy to say what it

is that they want proved, what it is that is such that unless they get a proof of it, they would not

say that I've proved it. But I can make it approach to explain what they want by saying that if I

had proved the propositions which I used as premises in my proofs, then they would perhaps admit I

had proved the existence of external things. So he's basically, I think, saying one place of

dissatisfaction with the proof I've given is that I'm taking the premises of my argument as being

self-evident and that they want another level proof that those premises are what it's the right

term sound valid, something like that. So that's one objection that he says he's aware of.

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