Thank you so much, Nabil. So may I begin by thanking Nabil for kindly organizing this seminar

and for inviting me to deliver a presentation in such distinguished company. I've known

Nabil for many years ever since he was a student and as Catherine was saying earlier, it's a pleasure

to have him now as a colleague and to see him

leading such fantastic initiatives both in cells and beyond. So within the framework of a seminar,

which is devoted to considering whether the rule of law is a unifying principle or a source of this agreement in the union

legal order, I have been tasked with considering the challenges that are involved in enforcing

the rule of law as a value in the union legal order. So if I may, I would like to consider three main themes in my

presentation. The first one is the thorny issue debated, as you all know, for a long time,

as to whether the rule of law as a value is designed to be primarily a constitutional, abstract principle

or a norm that could be politically, legally and judicially enforced. And if it can be enforced,

then how this enforceability fits in terms of the different mechanisms that are available in EU law and those

available before the Court of Justice of the EU.

The second theme is an examination of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European

Union that shows, as some of the previous speakers,

Lord Baker and Catherine also alluded to it, shows an evolution of the rule of law

from what seemed to be a symbolic value to what I would describe as a process of judicial amplification

of the rule of law value through other primary provisions of EU law,

and to the latest step, which is represented in the pending proceedings against Hungary,

which have been brought by the Commission, which raises the question of the self-standing force of Article 2, or

the values in Article 2 in infringement proceedings.

This is the pending Commission versus Hungary that concerns Hungarian legislation, arguably

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