David Laidler on Money
EconTalk
Library of Economics and Liberty
4.7 • 4.4K Ratings
🗓️ 16 September 2013
⏱️ 65 minutes
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| 0:00.0 | Welcome to Econ Talk, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty. I'm your host Russ Roberts |
| 0:07.8 | of Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Our website is econtalk.org or you can subscribe, |
| 0:14.4 | comment on this podcast, and find links and other information related to today's conversation. |
| 0:19.5 | We'll also find our archives where you can listen to every episode we've ever done going |
| 0:23.3 | back to 2006. Our email address is maladycontalk.org. We'd love to hear from you. |
| 0:32.4 | Today is August 26, 2013, and my guest is David Ladler of the University of Western Ontario. |
| 0:39.9 | He has written widely on monetary economics and was the research assistant for Friedman |
| 0:44.4 | and Schwartz's classic Monetary History of the United States. David, welcome to Econ Talk. |
| 0:50.0 | I'm very glad to be here. Thank you for having me. So I want to start with the great depression |
| 0:54.6 | and Friedman and Schwartz's work. They had very revolutionary views of what caused the depression |
| 1:02.4 | and the failure of the economy to recover. What did they try to teach us in that book? |
| 1:07.8 | Well, let's first remember that that book was from 1867 to 1960. It wasn't just about the great |
| 1:15.2 | depression. What they tried to teach us about the great depression specifically was that it was |
| 1:21.4 | a particularly extreme example of a pattern that you could see throughout American monetary history, |
| 1:27.8 | namely that if you allowed the rate of money growth to collapse, you were going to bring about |
| 1:32.9 | a downturn in the economy. More specifically, as far as the depression was concerned, |
| 1:39.6 | they argued that the federal reserve system turned a fairly routine downturn that started in 1929 |
| 1:48.2 | into an absolute catastrophe by, first of all, failing to act to support the banking system |
| 1:55.6 | in the first year of the downturn. Then just failing to take vigorous action to get the monetary |
| 2:03.1 | system expanding again over the next two years, culminating in the bank holiday of 1933 |
| 2:10.5 | and the raising of the price of gold and all the rest of it. So in a nutshell, the message was |
| 2:16.7 | the great depression that was not a sign that there was some deep flaw in the market economy, |
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