Came In Like A Teching Ball
Politix
Politix
4.6 • 1.4K Ratings
🗓️ 24 March 2023
⏱️ 61 minutes
🧾️ Download transcript
Summary
Transcript
Click on a timestamp to play from that location
| 0:00.0 | Hello and welcome to Positively Dreadful with me, your host, Brian Boydler. |
| 0:24.7 | I joked about this recently last episode actually, but let's, for real, talk about Silicon |
| 0:29.2 | Valley Bank, why it failed, why it got bailed out, what unintended consequences we may have |
| 0:35.3 | unleashed by bailing it out, and whether this is a big snafu or a small one. So my basic |
| 0:42.0 | understanding of what happened is that there were three regional bank failures, more or less |
| 0:47.7 | simultaneously, but two of them, Silvergate and Signature Bank, we've kind of collectively |
| 0:53.6 | agreed to shrug off because those banks blew themselves up with reckless cryptocurrency investments. |
| 1:01.0 | Silicon Valley Bank sucked up all the attention because its depositors and creditors included |
| 1:06.9 | tons of tech startups and the venture capitalists that fund them. And it failed by over-investing |
| 1:14.9 | in long-term government bonds, which to the untrained ear sounds like it should be a pretty safe |
| 1:19.5 | investment. But then we experienced inflation, the Fed hiked short-term interest rates, it reduced |
| 1:25.8 | the value of the long-term bonds, SVB then developed liquidity problems, which it tried to solve by |
| 1:33.5 | selling assets and borrowing money, and then bam, Peter Teal and other institutional clients |
| 1:38.6 | triggered a run on the bank, and that was the end of that. At least I think that's what happened. |
| 1:43.4 | If I'm wrong, I'm pretty sure my guest today will set me straight, but a few other things happened |
| 1:48.4 | on the way to the bailout, which the government announced just a few days after SUV entered |
| 1:54.6 | receivership. One is that in 2018, under Donald Trump, the Republican-controlled Congress, |
| 2:01.6 | with some help from Democrats, deregulated this very class of so-called mid-sized or regional banks |
| 2:08.8 | at those banks behest. SVB's risk exposure would probably have been detected and its failure |
| 2:15.3 | prevented if Congress had just let well enough alone. The second thing is that in the four-day |
| 2:22.1 | lag between the bank run and the bailout, SVB's richest, most powerful depositors tried to whip up |
| 2:29.6 | a broader banking panic in order to build pressure on the government to make them completely whole. |
... |
Please login to see the full transcript.
Disclaimer: The podcast and artwork embedded on this page are from Politix, and are the property of its owner and not affiliated with or endorsed by Tapesearch.
Generated transcripts are the property of Politix and are distributed freely under the Fair Use doctrine. Transcripts generated by Tapesearch are not guaranteed to be accurate.
Copyright © Tapesearch 2026.

