Timothy Edgar and Paul Rosenzweig on the Volt Typhoon Cyber Intrusion
The Lawfare Podcast
The Lawfare Institute
4.7 • 6.4K Ratings
🗓️ 19 March 2024
⏱️ 55 minutes
🧾️ Download transcript
Summary
Last May, Microsoft announced that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group, Volt Typhoon, appeared to be targeting U.S. critical infrastructure and entities abroad in part through establishing a presence in a malware-infected network, or botnet, consisting of old devices located in the United States. At the end of January, the Justice Department announced it had removed the botnet from hundreds of American devices.
Cybersecurity experts Timothy Edgar and Paul Rosenzweig both wrote articles for Lawfare discussing the Volt Typhoon intrusion and the U.S. response. But the authors take away very different lessons from the intrusion. Edgar argued that although the removal of the botnet was a success in terms of cybersecurity, the legal theory the government relied on for conducting this operation has dangerous privacy implications. Rosenzweig, on the other hand, contended that the Volt Typhoon breach illuminates flawed assumptions at the core of the U.S. cybersecurity strategy, which he says must be reexamined.
Lawfare Research Fellow Matt Gluck spoke with Edgar and Rosenzweig about why the Volt Typhoon intrusion and the U.S. response that followed matter for the future of U.S. cybersecurity and privacy, how the government should weigh security and privacy when responding to cyber intrusions, whether nuclear conflict is a good analogy for cyber conflict, and much more.
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Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | The following podcast contains advertising. |
| 0:04.0 | To access an ad-free version of the Lawfair Podcast, |
| 0:08.0 | become a material supporter of Lawfair at Patreon.com slash Lawfair. That's Patreon.com |
| 0:16.4 | slash Lawfair. Also check out Lawfair's other podcast offerings, rational security, chatter, lawfare no bull, and the aftermath. |
| 0:27.0 | Congress should revisit this because if we continue to expand Rule 41 in this way |
| 0:39.2 | and authorize more and more nationwide hacking warrants we may end up in a place that we don't like |
| 0:45.7 | because we'll be giving the government broad power to search any digital device |
| 0:50.7 | anywhere in the country if it says that the code is illegal. |
| 0:55.0 | I'm Matt Gluck, research fellow at Law Fair, and this is the Law Fair Podcast, March 19th, 2024. |
| 1:02.0 | Last May, Microsoft announced |
| 1:04.4 | that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group, |
| 1:06.8 | Volt Typhoon, appeared to be targeting US critical infrastructure |
| 1:10.8 | and entities abroad, in part through establishing a presence in a malware infected network or Botnet consisting of old devices located in the United States. |
| 1:20.0 | At the end of January, the Justice Department announced it had removed the botnet from hundreds of American devices. |
| 1:27.0 | Cybersecurity experts, Timothy Edgar, and Paul Rosenzweig both wrote articles for lawfare discussing the Volt Typhoon |
| 1:34.0 | Intrusion and the US response but the authors take away very different lessons |
| 1:38.6 | from the intrusion. Edgar argued that although the removal of the botnet was a success in terms of cyber security, |
| 1:46.0 | the legal theory the government relied on for conducting this operation has dangerous privacy implications. |
| 1:52.0 | Rose and Swig, on the other hand, |
| 1:54.4 | contended that the Volt Typhoon breach |
| 1:56.5 | illuminates flawed assumptions at the core |
| 1:58.8 | of the US cybersecurity strategy, |
... |
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