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But it's also true that to the degree to which this is a function of the U.S. China competition,

not all regions and not all countries are equally important in that competition.

So if the Chinese, for example, want to establish a naval base in Papua New Guinea or the South Pacific,

that would be of pretty significant concern to the United States because of the way it could have the effect of pushing the U.S. Navy back.

If the Chinese want Huawei to build out the 5G network in Papua New Guinea or an island in the South Pacific,

that doesn't seem to me to rise to the same level of concern.

Overall, there's a secondary point, I think, in what the National Security Service is trying to say,

...