We'll hear argument next in case 25-197 T.M. versus the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation.

Ms. Preligar.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, over the past century, this Court has found

a lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in exactly two cases, Rooker and Feldman.

In both, the plaintiffs sought to challenge a final decision from a state high court, and both cases held that Section 1257 gives only this

court jurisdiction over that kind of judgment. Most recently, the court said the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine should be confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name.

Yet lower courts haven't heeded that message.

Some continue to apply a jurisdictional bar far beyond Rooker and Feldman.

But the correct rule is this.

Rooker-Feldman applies only to cases that seek review and rejection of final judgments of state

high courts. That rule follows from text, history, and structure. On text, section 1257 is the

statutory hook for the doctrine. That statute gives this court jurisdiction over final judgments of state

high courts, and so by negative inference denies the same jurisdiction to district courts.

The Section 1257 says nothing at all about district court jurisdiction when there's no final

judgment of a state high court. On history, district courts have long heard collateral attacks on state lower court

judgments in narrow circumstances. Neither Rooker nor Feldman silently overturned that historical

practice. And on federal court structure, our rule respects doctrines like preclusion,

abstention, and the Anti-Injunction Act. Those doctrines already weed out

duplicative cases. There's no good reason for Rooker Feldman to broadly supplant them.

Respondent's rule finds no support in text, history, or precedent. It would untether Rooker

Feldman from Section 1257. It would override historical practice and state preclusion rules.

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