We'll hear argument next in case 24320 Soto v. United States.

Ms. Flint.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, this case starts and ends with the text

of the combat-related special compensation statute.

Because that statute grants the Secretary concerned authority to settle claims for CRSC,

the Barring Act does not apply.

A statute grants settlement authority if it authorizes a specific government official to do two things,

determine whether a claim is valid and determine the amount due.

Settlement authority does not exist if a statute merely creates a substantive right to payment.

The grant of authority to a specific official to administratively determine

the validity of the claim and the amount due is the touchstone. The CRSC statute does that.

Start with subsection D. It provides for the Secretary of a military department to consider

whether a veteran is eligible for CRSC using CRSC-specific procedures and criteria.

Because subsection D authorizes the Secretary to consider whether a veteran is eligible

for CRSC, it authorizes a specific government official to determine whether the claim is

valid.

Then subsections A and B say the Secretary concerned shall determine the amount of CRSC owed,

meaning a specific official is authorized to determine the amount due. The CRSC statute in this way grants the

Secretary concerned all authority needed to determine validity and amount due, so the Barring Act

does not apply. Other military compensation statutes that the government has pointed to don't have all of these provisions,

requiring a particular government official to use particular procedures to determine an individual's entitlement to a particular benefit.

All of this is in the CRSC statute because CRSC is different from a lot of other forms of military compensation.

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