I think a lot of this, you know, a lot of the pathologies of sanctions really are rooted

in the fact that we don't have a robust policy infrastructure in place for executing sanctions.

You know, the White House wasn't even sure that they were going to go after VTB, you know,

the second largest bank in Russia. And then, you know, a week into the war, they had sanctioned the central bank of after VTB, you know, the second largest bank in Russia. And then,

you know, a week into the war, they had sanctioned the central bank of Russia, which is by any measure

the largest sanctions target in modern history.

Hey, welcome back to the Modern War Institute podcast. I'm John Amble, editorial director at

MWI. And for the past few months, we have published a ton of

articles and podcast episodes analyzing and commenting on the war in Ukraine. Most of them have

been centered on, or at least related to the military aspects of that conflict, from drones to

armor, from tactics to strategy, and from a precise focus on Ukraine to the wider implications for NATO.

The military conduct of that war has had a substantial international component

as Ukraine's foreign supporters have supplied a wide range of weapons and equipment.

But alongside providing that support, there's another role being played by the United States,

its European allies and partners around the world, putting in place

a massive sanctions regime targeting Russia. We're going to explore that topic on this episode.

To do so, I'm joined by Edward Fishman. He is a former government official who worked extensively

on sanctions policy, and he is now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American

Security and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for New American Security and a

non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

He also teaches a graduate level seminar on economic statecraft at Columbia University, so he has

a really insightful perspective on the subject of sanctions.

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