I think the Iranians view the Shia military groups as a much more tactical solution,

vice a strategic one.

I would argue that the Iranians have less command and control over the Houthis than probably

any of their other proxy

groups. If you look at even the weapons inventories that the Iraqi militants have and the

Shia militants have in Syria, they're not close to saying what Hezbollah has.

Hey, welcome back to the Modern War Institute podcast. I'm John Nambl, editorial director at

MWI, and on this episode, I wanted to discuss something that for months now has been a growing

feature of the security landscape of the Middle East, Iran's network of proxy groups.

The Houthi movement has been launching attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea.

Observers have watched

for signs of Hezbollah involvement in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, and militant groups

in Syria and Iraq have been targeting U.S. forces. All of these groups have relationships

with Iran. To explore those relationships, their nuances and their differences, and U.S. policy

regarding this constellation of Iranian

proxies, I'm joined today by Jonathan Panikoff. He spent years in key positions in the U.S.

intelligence community, including serving as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for

the Near East at the National Intelligence Council, and he is now the director of the Skowcroft

Middle East

Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. His experience and deep knowledge of the Middle

East make him the perfect guess for an important discussion on Iran's use of proxies.

Before we get to that discussion, a couple notes. First, if you're not yet subscribed to the

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