Next question, dear Professor Craig, my Bible study in Boise, Idaho is going through

on guard. We have grandmothers, parents, and other couples in the group. Our kids play upstairs while we discuss your book. During

discussion tonight, one of the other guys, a computational mathematician, raised

an objection to the Kalam. It reminded me of your interaction with West Morriston on this

very objection. Morriston argues that the Kalam fails to establish a personal creator of the universe.

Instead, for all it shows, the cause might be non-personal.

His basic idea is that God's timeless intention

to create a universe must be sufficient for the effect,

in which case God's intention to create is timeless and eternal.

This is sufficient for a universe that is likewise eternal.

If somehow a personal cause could be nonetheless causing a universe

with a beginning, then it's not clear why a non-personal cause cannot do the same.

You respond that Morrison fails to distinguish between God's timeless intention to create a temporal universe and God's exercising causal

powers to bring about the universe. The actual exercise of the causal powers

involves or is an intrinsic change to God, bringing him into time with

the creation of the universe.

Thus, even though the intention to create is an eternal, the actual exercise of the causal powers is a

temporal event, producing a temporal effect, a universe with a beginning.

Your response to Morrison seems to me a bit too quick,

however, it fails to appreciate Morrison's point

that there doesn't seem to be a big enough difference between personal and non-personal causes,

if the personal cause is a-temporal, Sans, the universe.

...