This question from Tanner in the United States, high doctor Craig, I want to thank

you for all that you've done for the intellectual case of Christianity and for strengthening the

faith of many, including myself. I always use your work to answer my questions and I'm

very grateful for the abundance of resources here on the reasonable faith website. It is

on the website that I've come to watch the videos on Leibniz's contingency argument

and the Kalam Cosmological argument, part two, philosophical. In the Leibniz video, it's

suggested that numbers exist necessarily as, quote, it's impossible for them not to exist.

While in the Kalam video, it's suggested that numbers don't exist at all when the objection

of actual infinity and numbers is brought up. It seems that for one argument in support

of the existence of God, we hold that numbers exist and in another, we hold that they don't

exist. Wouldn't the skeptic be able to say that there's a contradiction and therefore

be able to cancel one of the arguments? I'm aware that you support the view that numbers

don't exist as acknowledging the existence of numbers supports Platonism and suggests

the existence of an actual infinity, but how can we justify saying the opposite that

numbers do exist in Leibniz's contingency argument? I'm sure I'm misunderstanding something,

but could you explain to me what and perhaps tell me why numbers don't exist when they

correspond so well with reality? I do think that Tanner has a misunderstanding in the

Leibnizian cosmological argument. I do not claim that numbers exist. In fact, I think

there are no such things as numbers. What I'm simply saying is that for Platonists,

numbers would be examples of something that exists by an necessity of its own nature.

I'm trying to help viewers understand what it is to be a metaphysically necessary being.

Now, in fact, I think that God is the only metaphysically necessary being, but to try to make

...