This question from Tanner in the United States.

Hi Dr Craig, I want to thank you for all that you've done for the intellectual case of Christianity

and for strengthening the faith of many, including myself.

I always use your work to answer my questions and I'm very grateful for the abundance of resources

here on the reasonable faith website. It is on the website that I've come to watch the videos on

Leibniz's contingency argument and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Part 2, Philosophical. In the Leibniz video, it's suggested that numbers exist necessarily as, quote,

it's impossible for them not to exist.

While in the Kalam video, it's suggested that numbers don't exist at all when the objection of actual

infinity in numbers is brought up.

It seems that for one argument in support of the existence of God we hold that numbers exist and in another we hold that they don't exist.

Wouldn't the skeptic be able to say that there's a contradiction and therefore be able to cancel one of the arguments?

I am aware that you support the view that numbers don't exist, as acknowledging the existence of numbers supports

Platonism and suggests the existence of numbers supports Platonism and suggests the existence of an actual infinity,

but how can we justify saying the opposite that numbers do exist in Leibniz's contingency argument. I'm sure I'm misunderstanding

something but could you explain to me what and perhaps tell me why numbers

don't exist when they correspond so well with a reality?

I do think that Tanner has a misunderstanding.

In the Leibnizian cosmological argument,

I do not claim that numbers exist. In fact, I think there are no such things as numbers. What I'm simply saying is that for

platenists, numbers would be examples of something that exists by a necessity of its own

nature. I'm trying to help viewers understand what it is to be a metaphysically necessary being.

Now, in fact, I think that God is the only metaphysically necessary being,

...