Hello, Dr. Craig.

In your 2024 EPS paper, anthropological and Christological compositionalism, you argue that a person is identical

to his soul. You've also argued for the Trinity as one soul with three rational faculties.

Does this create some tension for your view of the incarnation? It seems that either Jesus has to use

part of the divine soul for the incarnation, or is both,

or part of, a divine soul, and adds on a human soul, thus having or being two souls.

And in that latter case, do you believe that a soul can exist without grounding a personal I?

During the Q and A at EPS 2024, someone asked,

Would this be one exception where each person of the Trinity can't say,

I am identical to my soul because of your particular view of the Trinity?

And you ended your response by saying that

God is a tripersonal soul, whereas we are unipersonal souls. What am I missing? And how would this

factor into my question? Thank you for your response. Eric, United States.

My argument that a human person is not a soul-body composite, but rather a soul, intimately united with a body as an instrument, was restricted to human persons, Eric.

In general, a unipersonal soul is a person.

But a tripersonal soul, like God, is obviously not a person, for that would be self-contradictory.

As a soul equipped with three sets of cognitive faculties,

each sufficient for personhood, God is tripersonal, not a person. According to classic Christian theology, the second person of the Trinity, the Logos, acquired

a distinct human soul, and so has in effect two souls, one divine and one human, though orthodoxy

would never use language of this sort. I do not like this view,

because I do not, as you put it, believe that a soul can exist without grounding a personal

eye. A human soul distinct from the Logos would be another person, leading to the heresy of Nestorianism.

...