Hello, Dr. Craig.

In their book,

Dieu, La Science, Le Prueves,

two French engineers,

Michel Bollore and Olivier Bonassi,

offer an argument for the contingency of matter in five pages that can be summed up like this.

1. Any matter can take a wide or infinite range of values regarding their mass and their space

occupied. Two, if one, then there are possible worlds for any matter in which it has a different size or weight.

3. If, 2, then it is false that any matter with a certain size and weight is necessary.

What do you think, Dr. Craig? Is the argument sound or weak? I'd love to hear your commentary on it. And I am sure Boloray and Bonesses

would love too, since they reference your work in their book, which just arrived in English

version. Dorel, Ivory Coast. It's wonderful to know that we have readers in Ivory Coast,

Dorel. While I cannot respond to Boloray or Bonacieux directly,

since I haven't read them, I can respond to your summary. At face value, it seems to me that

three does not follow from two. All that follows is that the size and weight of matter is contingent,

but not that the matter itself is contingent. From what we've been told, it seems that the matter

could exist in every possible world with different sizes and weights. Perhaps they're assuming that a

necessary being cannot have any contingent properties. But that does not seem to be true. God, for

example, exists in every possible world, but with different states of knowledge in each world.

So why couldn't the same matter exist in every possible world in different sizes and weights?

What they would need to argue here, it seems, is that if matter differs in its size and weight,

then it is not the same matter, but a different matter.

...