Hello, Dr. Craig.

Recently, Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen have developed a fascinating, cutting-edge argument called

the modal argument from beginnings, or M-A-B. It seeks to reach the same conclusion of the classic

argument from contingency you defend using quite modest premises, and it appears robust.

Here is the argument. One, for any positive state of

affairs, S, that can begin to obtain, it is at least possible for there to be something external

to S that causes S to obtain. Two, it is at least possible for there to be a beginning of the positive state of

affairs that there exist contingent concrete things. 3. If 1 and 2 are true, it is possible

that there exists a necessary concrete thing. 4. It's possible that a necessary concrete thing exists.

5.

If it's possible that a necessary concrete thing exists, then a necessary concrete thing exists.

S5 axiom.

6.

Therefore, a necessary concrete thing exists.

This argument is fully compatible with uncaused contingent beginnings,

brute facts, ungrounded infinite causal regresses, internal contingent explanations,

or circular causal chains.

From a necessary concrete being, it seems like a pretty short inference to

theistic considerations, since an impersonal necessity simply cannot ground contingency,

as you surely know. My question is, do you think this argument is a good one? Is it plausibly

sound? Why or why not? If so, do you think it surpasses the

traditional argument from contingency in its modesty, or would you advocate for it being

...