It's difficult to make these analyses because in a lot of the time with resilience, you only

find out some institutional problems when something finally goes wrong to this extent.

It's granted with PG&E it's happened multiple times, repeated times, and the reason it kept

happening was fundamentally they go away with it.

It seems like it's real difficult for people with a lot of

this stuff to kind of think on the right time frame, right? Like I feel like this is, this just

keeps on occurring to me over and over with like all these different systems. We had,

maybe like last year sometime, I think, Pete Davis interviewed Charles Marone of strong towns about

some of these kind of same themes in terms of like,

okay, yes, we can get everybody really excited about building infrastructure. And it seems like

in the UK you all overbuilt the infrastructure, which was probably a good idea. But, you know,

it's much easier to get federal funding here for building new infrastructure than it is for

maintaining old infrastructure.

And it seems like those maintenance costs, they're kind of so far down the line that people

almost have trouble thinking about them. And I think this occurs in like a bunch of different

contexts, you know, and is the same sort of thinking that causes, you know, people to be like,

oh, you know, yes, we realize we've got a

limited aquifer here for a water resource. So what we're going to do is we're going to draw it

down in a way that'll make it last 25 years. Because it seems like by then we should have

figured out something else, right? Or that'll make people say, you know, the one giant concrete

pipe that carries the water in my hometown from our reservoir

to the town was built in like, I don't know, like 1952 or something. And it had an expected life of

...