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Cato Podcast

Obama's Permanent Bailouts

Cato Podcast

Cato Institute

Cato, Peace, Policy, Politics, Markets, Defense, Government, News, News Commentary, 424708, Immigration, Libertarian

4.5979 Ratings

🗓️ 4 February 2010

⏱️ 6 minutes

🧾️ Download transcript

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Transcript

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0:00.0

This is the Kado Daily Podcast for Thursday, February 4th, 2010.

0:07.0

I'm Caleb Brown.

0:08.0

President Obama's planned bank reform includes giving regulators the power to bail out banks on a seemingly regular basis.

0:14.4

What's that mean for banks and taxpayers?

0:16.8

According to the Cato Institute's Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Mark Calabria,

0:21.4

it's a fiscal hazard for taxpayers and moral hazard for banks.

0:27.0

This is the interesting thing about this is that the president did repeatedly say,

0:32.0

I mean, despite his own vote as a senator for it, he's

0:34.0

repeatedly said, you know why I think the tarp was the right thing to do, I hated

0:38.3

doing it and I hated supporting I hated voting for it. You know yet when you look at the proposal he's put forward to

0:45.9

reform our financial system, it's essentially a permanent tarp. Under both the

0:50.9

House passed bill and the plan that President Obama has put out,

0:54.0

yes, the regulators have the ability to impose losses, but they also have the ability to bail

0:59.8

everybody out. So you know what the president says is he's essentially ending bailouts by the

1:05.4

regulators you're going to catch it next time, but if they don't, then they'll be able to bail

1:08.7

out. How does that change the incentives for banks? It creates a massive amount of what economists call moral hazard

1:14.8

which is you know these is because the banks know that somebody will be there to

1:18.1

catch them when they fall you know they will take greater risk even more importantly

1:22.1

in this case is that their creditors will take greater risk. Even more importantly in this case is that their creditors will take

1:24.7

greater risks. The people who lend these banks money have less incentive now to do due

1:29.8

diligence on the banks themselves because the creditors will feel like, well, you know, if I lend

1:35.1

goldman money, Goldman might go down and their shareholders might get wiped out, but hey, I want the money

...

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