This is the Cato Daily Podcast for Tuesday, September 10th, 2013.

I'm Caleb Brown.

There was a world of difference between cracking cryptography, which is the NSA's job, and attempting to weaken global

cryptography standards which may have had yet untold costs to privacy or economy and

cyber security.

So says Julian Sanchez, a research fellow at the Cato Institute.

It was reported recently that the NSA has been successful in breaking many forms of internet encryption.

That's the essential technology in a way that we all rely on.

Every time you log in and you don't want your password to be sniffed up by anyone who happens to be sharing the same

cafe or control a server somewhere between you and your bank, you rely on encryption.

Every time you use your credit card online, you're relying on encryption. Every time you use your credit card online, you're relying on encryption.

When you connect to Google to send a private email, you're relying on encryption.

The whole architecture of the internet depends on strong encryption. And the NSA hasn't just been good at making technological or mathematical advances to break codes.

That's their job.

That's what they're supposed to do, to be able to listen in our enemies, what they've

done according to some of these reports is gone further and essentially instead of

breaking encryption they have gotten into the business of promoting broken

encryption.

So in part that includes working with technology companies, obviously putting pressure on technology companies, to create vulnerabilities in software

and platforms that are supposed to be secure. And most shocking to a lot of the computer and crypto experts I've spoken to

they have worked to weaken at the very highest level the national and international standards and specifications

for various encryption protocols.

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