Corey mentioned that I wrote a book called Mind Matter Nature, which is a Thomistic proposal for the philosophy of mind.

What I'm going to actually say here is my proposal for Tomas is to stop it, stop doing philosophy of mind.

I think that, and this is the gist what I'm impressed here, is Tomas should be aloof to the problems of philosophy of mind.

And one of the benefits of that is the fight that a lot of philosophers of a non-material

sort sort of want to pick with the neurosciences is not our fight.

We don't have a dog in that race.

And that's sort of the case I've come to make to you tonight.

Okay.

So the title lecture is the compatibility

of neuroscience and the soul.

And just by virtue of the title,

it would seem that we're expecting there to be a problem, right?

That I have to come and show you the compatibility.

So we wouldn't expect there to be a compatibility between neuroscience and a, say, traditional conception of the soul. All right.

Let's talk about that first. Why would we expect there to be an incompatibility between

accepting the existence of the soul and say accepting the results of neuroscience.

I think if we were to query the, you know, the person on the street, maybe not all of you,

because you've had, you know, Thomas types coming to you for, you know, four or five times now,

maybe, you know, better than this. But I think if you were to ask the person on the street,

you know, what is the soul?

The sort of answer we would get would be something like it's what does my thinking or my feeling,

right, or what makes my decisions.

...