We'll hear argument next in case 24, 1068, Monsanto Company v. Dernel.

Mr. Clement.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court,

Respondent's label-based failure-to-warn claim is preempted twice over.

First, it is preempted by the express terms of FIFRA's express preemption clause,

which forecloses state labeling

claims that are in addition to or different from those imposed under FIFRA.

Here, a Missouri jury imposed a cancer warning requirement that the EPA does not require.

That additional requirement is preempted.

Now, respondent concedes, as he must, that the state tort law is a labeling

requirement for purposes of preemption clause.

Bates held as much.

Nonetheless, he insists that unless Congress expressly directs the agency to bind the judiciary,

then the requirements that are imposed on a particular pesticide in the registration process and

backed by criminal penalties are not federal requirements.

That defies common sense, the statutory text, and this Court's precedence. In particular, this Court's

eight-to-one decision in Regal, where this Court held that similar agency-imposed requirements on a

particular device are federal requirements for preemption purposes. The same result follows from principles of impossibility preemption.

The EPA regulation and the government's brief here makes crystal clear that a registrant

cannot change the safety warnings on a pesticide label without approval of the agency.

Thus, Missouri law here requires something that not only is not

required by federal law, but that federal law doesn't even allow. Either way you come to it,

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