More than ever, governments are relying on economic sanctions to try to bring other countries

into line.

Does the West's sanctioned addiction risk making a key instrument of foreign policy ineffective?

You're listening to Money Talks on Economist Radio, our weekly podcast on the markets,

the economy and the world of business.

I'm Patrick Lane, and also on today's show, why India is proving an attractive and clever

investor for poor countries concerned about Chinese influence?

And do plans for a football super league risk an own goal?

Last week, President Biden unveiled sweeping new sanctions aimed at the Russian economy.

Today, I have approved several steps, including the expulsion of several Russian officials

as a consequence of their actions.

The new measures are a response to the massive solar winds hack of federal agencies, interference

in last year's presidential election and Russia's treatment of dissidents, notably Alexei

Navalny, an imprisoned opposition leader on hunger strike and in very poor health.

I've also signed an executive order authorizing new measures, including sanctions to address

specific harmful actions that Russia has taken against US interests.

Russia has retaliated, and further sanctions are likely to follow.

I was clear with President Putin that we could have gone further, but I chose not to do so.

Economic penalties as an alternative to military intervention have a long history.

Their first recorded use was in 432 BC, when the Athenians banned traders from arrival

power from their marketplaces.

But in recent years, the popularity of sanctions has exploded, they've evolved from blanket

...