Even though the worst of the crisis has passed, we have a rattled set of allies and basically a lack of clarity for exactly what comes next.

But I think the only thing that we can say for certain is that given the administration's general approach to Europe over the last year, I wouldn't take a return to crisis at some point soon, whether that's weeks or months off the table.

It's the Lawfare podcast. I'm Molly Roberts, senior editor at Lawfare, here with Lawfare Public

Service Fellow Ari Tabatabai and visiting fellow at the Egmont Institute in Brussels, John Drennan.

China also welcomes the United States being distracted

elsewhere because it means that the more distracted the United States is fighting its own

allies within NATO, doing things in Latin America and so on and so forth. The less it's

going to be able to plan for and commit resources and assets of the Indo-Pacific.

And that means that China essentially has this broad opening that it can use to increase

its own influence and pursue its own goals.

Today, we're talking about the Greenland crisis and the international order.

So first, guys, I want to talk a

little bit about where we are and how we got here. John, can you give us some background on how

the Greenland Embrolio came to be and I guess also how it has resolved seemingly for now?

Absolutely. And thanks so much for having me today.

So we are now out of the acute phase of an intranato crisis triggered by direct threats

by the United States against the sovereignty of one of its NATO allies, Denmark.

It's the most dramatic episode in a series of growing U.S. Europe tensions since Trump

returned to the office

that are straining the alliance. President Trump has long talked about wanting to acquire

Greenland, typically by via purchasing it from Denmark. This dates back to his first term, at least.

He continued this pursuit in his second term. He's cited things like security concerns stemming from Russia and China, the need for sites related

...