Korean War #47: Ike Will Bring Them Home!
When Diplomacy Fails Podcast
Zack Twamley
4.8 • 773 Ratings
🗓️ 29 October 2018
⏱️ 50 minutes
🧾️ Download transcript
Summary
Episode 47: Ike Will Bring Them Home! This is our penultimate episode, and as such plays a critical role in bringing several threads of our narrative together. How fluent in the use of atomic diplomacy was Eisenhower’s administration? Armed with the knowledge we have from the last episode, we can state that Eisenhower was far from the first President to bring atomic weapons into the diplomatic discourse. Indeed, it makes sense that the first and last president of the US to make use of the atomic bomb should make the most active use of it in diplomacy. In addition, contrary to the conventional view, Eisenhower’s administration failed in the last phase of the Korean War to actually formulate a coherent policy regarding nuclear weapons and diplomatic pressure. For a number of reasons, the former General was content to drag his feet.
Dispensing with the myths of atomic diplomacy enables us to look more closely at the very real role which the Indians played in putting forward the policy ideas in the UN General Assembly, most notably in the case of the touchy prisoners issue. The genuine importance of Indian diplomacy in that institution has been greatly understated for some time, and in this episode we’ll give them their proper due. The Chinese will of course also need to be considered, since if atomic diplomacy did not force them to make peace, what can we say actually did? The answer has as much to do with the policy of bluff as it does with the death of Josef Stalin, and it’s another fascinating journey I can’t wait to take you on! Of course, the major appeal of this episode is in the loose ends are tied up – it is in this instalment of our series that the Korean War is finally brought to its anticlimactic end on 27th July 1953.
SPONSORS
1) Use the code WDF15 to get 15% off your stylish new pair of headphones/earphones/listening things
2) To access some fascinating books, nerd out with like minded enthusiasts, further your knowledge of some classical works, get 25% off your first three months AND help the show, head on over to onlinegreatbooks.com!
Remember to BEFIT!
B is for blog
E is for email wdfpodcast@hotmail.com
F is for Facebook, the Page and the Group
I is for iTunes, please rate, review and subscribe
T is for TELL ANYONE!
1) Pre-order our book on the Thirty Years War 2) Are you TeamFerdinand or TeamFrederick ? It's time to pick a side, and a t-shirt! 3) Don't forget of course to support WDF on Patreon to access ad-free episodes with the scripts attached, as well an hour of extra content every month, and so much more! - $1, $2 & $5 memberships available! 4) Of course, make sure you also follow us on Twitter, visit our website and sign up to ourGet bonus content on Patreon
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Transcript
Click on a timestamp to play from that location
| 0:00.0 | I'm Hello and welcome history friends, patrons all, to the Korean War episode 47, the penultimate episode of this very large series. |
| 0:37.0 | Last time we introduced you to the concept of nuclear diplomacy, a tactic which had |
| 0:41.1 | developed over the different stages of the Korean War as the Truman administration experienced |
| 0:46.0 | adversity, triumph and severe struggles. |
| 0:48.7 | We saw how President Truman was content to move the nuclear chess pieces across the board, |
| 0:55.0 | but that he never seriously considered using them under the circumstances, even when the People's Republic of China |
| 0:59.8 | intervened and launched their blistering counter-offensives over spring 1951. The Allies were able to |
| 1:06.0 | hold on under this onslaught, and after removing the man who had countenanced the sewing of a field of |
| 1:11.5 | nuclear waste along the communist supply lines, Truman seemed content to allow General Ridgeway |
| 1:16.7 | to just do his thing in Korea and do what he did. The truth negotiations proceeded apace |
| 1:22.3 | during the summer months, but what appeared first like a positive step was soon revealed as |
| 1:26.5 | a cynical communist delaying tactic |
| 1:28.4 | as their troops dug in and the potential for great gains in the war vanished. |
| 1:32.8 | During this period, the Truman administration's use of nuclear weapons to gain leverage |
| 1:36.8 | and apply pressure against the communists was used fluidly as Washington adapted to the constantly |
| 1:42.1 | changing circumstances both at home and abroad. |
| 1:45.6 | In the final analysis, it seems highly improbable that the Truman administration ever seriously |
| 1:50.8 | considered making use of the nuclear weapons and inflicting nuclear fire on the Chinese. |
| 1:56.4 | Only in certain circumstances, such as the direct Soviet involvement in Korea, or the touching |
| 2:01.6 | off of World War III in Western Europe, for example, would nuclear weapons even be used? |
| 2:06.6 | And even then, Truman had established a new subcommittee of the National Security Council, |
| 2:11.8 | for the very purpose of ensuring that such weapons would only be used as a last resort. |
... |
Please login to see the full transcript.
Disclaimer: The podcast and artwork embedded on this page are from Zack Twamley, and are the property of its owner and not affiliated with or endorsed by Tapesearch.
Generated transcripts are the property of Zack Twamley and are distributed freely under the Fair Use doctrine. Transcripts generated by Tapesearch are not guaranteed to be accurate.
Copyright © Tapesearch 2026.